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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, EXPRESSIVE 
ASSOCIATION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
JOSHUA S. SELLERS* 
Increasingly novel legal conflicts over electoral participation and voting 
rights are on the rise. For instance, multiple aspects of Georgia’s election system 
have been challenged, including the state’s “exact match” policy. An Arizona 
law imposing harsh penalties on initiative petition circulators who fail to 
respond to subpoenas is the subject of an ongoing lawsuit. And a Tennessee 
law that strictly regulated voter registration drives was recently enjoined and 
ultimately repealed. As states implement unprecedented methods of election 
administration, courts, in turn, are tasked with determining just what the 
“right to vote” entails and to what extent it encompasses efforts by 
organizations to engage voters in the political process. This Essay explores this 
dynamic and considers how more intensive methods of election administration 
may, paradoxically, result in a broader conception of the right to vote that the 
First Amendment expressly protects. 
Part I of this Essay summarizes the unresolved—and potentially dispositive—
doctrinal debate over the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to state 
laws implicating both voting and expressive association. Part II examines the 
doctrinal irresolution in the context of two recent cases, Miracle v. Hobbs in 
Arizona and League of Women Voters v. Hargett in Tennessee. Viewed 
together, these cases illustrate the contingent nature of organizations’ ability to 
engage voters; an ambiguity of great consequence as we approach Election 2020. 
Part III outlines the short and long-term political significance of whether a capacious 
or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in this context prevails. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A voter who believes her right to vote has been unjustifiably denied 
or abridged can invoke several viable legal claims.1 Likewise, 
organizations that facilitate others’ right to vote may raise similar 
claims when their efforts are impeded.2 Such legal disputes are 
typically unremarkable. However, increasingly novel legal conflicts 
over electoral participation and voting rights are on the rise. As states 
implement unprecedented methods of election administration, courts, 
in turn, are tasked with determining just what the “right to vote” entails,3 
and to what extent it encompasses efforts by organizations to engage 
voters in the political process. This Essay explores this dynamic and 
considers how more intensive methods of election administration may, 
paradoxically, result in a broader conception of the right to vote that 
the First Amendment expressly protects. 
Traditionally conceived, the right to vote is the right of any U.S. 
citizen to show up at a polling place on a legislatively determined 
Election Day and cast a ballot.4 That basic conception, of course, vastly 
oversimplifies matters. For one, simply showing up is not always easy, 
particularly in jurisdictions where polling sites are few and far between.5 
Even assuming access, one’s experience at a polling site will depend on 
the type of ballot and voting machine used.6 Furthermore, even the idea 
of a single election day is oversimplified: many voters can cast their 
ballot in person prior to Election Day or participate by mail.7 In some 
 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. 
 3. See Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 460 (2019) 
(“Aggressive litigant skepticism of new election laws has, in turn, put courts in a 
skeptical posture of new election laws.”). 
 4. Federal statutes establish Election Day for the House of Representatives and 
the Senate as the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even calendar 
years and for the President and Vice President as the first Tuesday after the First Monday 
in November every fourth year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7. States and local 
governments, for the most part, remain free to hold their elections when they desire. 
 5. See LEADERSHIP CONF. ED. FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE 
CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 8 (Sept. 2019), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/ 
reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SS5-D2HY] (“Closing polling 
places has a cascading effect, leading to long lines at other polling places, 
transportation hurdles, denial of language assistance and other forms of in-person 
help, and mass confusion about where eligible voters may cast their ballot.”). Also, it 
is often difficult to travel to government agencies that register voters and issue 
qualifying forms of voter identification. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 47, Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, No. 1:18-cv-00222 
(D.N.D. Feb. 28, 2019) (“Travel to a driver’s license site to obtain a qualifying North 
Dakota ID imposes a severe burden on Native American voters. Only 19 [driver’s 
license (DL)] sites exist across the state, and there is not a single DL site on an 
Indian reservation in the state. The DL sites closest to North Dakota Indian 
reservations have limited hours and require eligible voters to drive . . . substantial 
distances in order to obtain qualifying ID.”). 
 6. Ballots and voting machines vary greatly both in their design and in their 
ease of use, a point driven home by, among other notable examples, Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“This case has shown that punchcard balloting machines can 
produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, 
complete way by the voter.”), and Maine’s recent adoption of ranked-choice voting 
for both congressional and presidential elections. See Maggie Astor, Maine Voters Will 
Rank Their Top Presidential Candidates in 2020, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/us/politics/maine-elections.html. 
 7. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 4 TIPS FOR MANAGING ALTERNATIVE VOTING 
METHODS 1 (Oct. 2014), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/EAC 
_4TipsForVotingMethods_508_HiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YP5-KPGW] (“Nationwide 
voting has slowly moved from one Election Day toward an election period of several days 
or weeks that can involve a variety of methods for voting.”). 
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locations, even smartphone voting is underway.8 In short, the right to 
vote encompasses a range of activities far exceeding the mere 
completion of a paper ballot in a private booth. 
In addition to encompassing the activities of individuals, the right to 
vote also encompasses organizational activities. For instance, laws that 
impede the ability of political parties to encourage voter participation 
implicate both the First Amendment right of association afforded to 
parties and individuals’ right to vote.9 Nonpolitical party 
organizations that facilitate others’ right to vote—e.g., The League of 
Women Voters and Rock the Vote—enjoy similar legal standing when 
their efforts are hampered. Viewed from a distance, then, a “voting 
ecosystem”10 begins to take shape: the law entitles individuals to vote 
on generally equal terms with others, subject to reasonable methods 
of state election administration, and protects the endeavors of 
organizations that aid in that process.11 
These basic tenets are uncontroversial as far as they go, yet on their 
own, fail to resolve actual legal challenges. In recent years, states have 
enacted, with both legitimate and pretextual justifications, laws that 
make it harder to vote.12 Some of these laws target voters, others 
target organizations.13 Many involve the imposition of onerous 
bureaucratic processes that individuals or organizations must 
navigate in order to comply with the law and, in some instances, avoid 
the prospect of criminal charges.14 In response, litigants have 
advanced creative legal theories with the hope of expanding the 
definitional parameters of the right to vote.15 This Essay explores 
whether existing voting rights doctrine can facilitate such an expansion, 
such that organizational rights are robustly protected. 
Resolution of the organizational question requires resolution of a 
normative framing question: do we wish to adopt a broad conception of 
our voting system, one that apprehends the interrelationship between 
 
 8. See, e.g., John Dahlia, History-Making, Mobile Voting App for Overseas Military Now 
in 24 Counties, WVNEWS.COM (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.wvnews.com/ews/ 
wvnews/history-making-mobile-voting-app-for-overseas-military-now-in/article_ 
0402b7dd-af11-56ed-a42d-5981a214f9c0.html [https://perma.cc/37G9-JBZQ]; Miles 
Parks, Exclusive: Seattle-Area Voters To Vote By Smartphone In 1st For U.S. Elections, NPR 
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798126153/exclusive-seattle-area-
voters-to-vote-by-smartphone-in-1st-for-u-s-elections [https://perma.cc/8VN3-CSZE]. 
 9. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (“In the present situation 
the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the 
right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of 
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both 
of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms.”). 
 10. The idea of a voting or election “ecosystem” is taken from STEVEN F. HUEFNER 
ET AL., FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTION 
ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 2 (2011) (“[W]e view the elections systems of 
all five states as ecosystems in which it is dangerous to tinker with one element 
without considering how it might affect the others.”). 
 11. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1159 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (“Together speech and voting are constitutional rights of 
special significance; they are the rights most protective of all others, joined in this 
respect by the ability to vindicate one’s rights in a federal court.”); see also Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 763 (2016) (“What is the 
relationship between the First Amendment right to expressive association and the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote? It’s closer than you probably think.”). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room: 
Intentional Voter Suppression 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 217 (2018) (“[N]ow that litigants 
no longer need to frame their arguments with one eye on Justice Kennedy, there may 
be more space for the maturation of legal theories to prevent voter suppression, even 
if those theories do not bear immediate fruit.”). 
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various elements of the electoral system? Consider, for example, the 2018 
election cycle in Georgia, a high-profile election in which nearly four-
million votes were cast, a state record.16 Much of the enthusiasm was 
driven by a closely watched gubernatorial election between Secretary of 
State Brian Kemp and his Democratic opponent, former minority leader of 
the Georgia House of Representatives, Stacey Abrams.17 Abrams was seeking 
to make history as the nation’s first African-American female governor.18 
While Secretary Kemp eventually triumphed, Abrams initially 
refused to concede, openly incriminating an election system riddled 
with flaws, many of which she accused Secretary Kemp of 
exacerbating. 19 She carried that message forward, forming an 
organization—Fair Fight Action—that is leading the legal fight 
against multiple aspects of Georgia’s election system on behalf of 
voters.20 The organization’s principal lawsuit charged Georgia 
election officials with unconstitutionally purging eligible voters; 
implementing an “exact match” policy, which requires a showing of 
identical personal information on various government records;21 
unlawfully closing polling places; unlawfully denying voters access to 
provisional ballots; unlawfully distributing and managing absentee 
ballots; and maintaining an election system vulnerable to hacking.22 
The lawsuit claimed that these “problems in Georgia’s voting system 
are pervasive, severe, chronic, and persistent.”23 
At its core, the lawsuit seeks judicial acknowledgment of a 
comprehensive conception of the right to vote. Its claims presume 
that the law entitles voters to an electoral system that is relatively easy 
 
 16. Maya T. Prabhu, Midterm Voter Turnout Surges in Georgia, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 
7, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/midterm-voter-turnout-
surges-georgia/P51TgGVyRJxwcKufdXKncM [https://perma.cc/6ARZ-VTAR]. 
 17. See Richard Faussett, How Voting Became a Central Issue in the Georgia Governor’s Race, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/ politics/georgia-
governor-voting-irregularities.html. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Alan Blinder & Richard Fausset, Stacey Abrams Ends Fight for Georgia Governor 
with Harsh Words for Her Rival, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/elections/georgia-governor-race-kemp-abrams.html 
(“Although she pledged to pray for Mr. Kemp, she also uncorked a bracing 
indictment of his tenure as secretary of state, including the election last week. She 
excoriated a system, overseen by Mr. Kemp and legions of local officials, that left 
voters lawfully purged from the rolls, waiting in the rain and facing rejections of their 
ballots for arbitrary reasons.”). 
 20. See Jelani Cobb, Stacey Abrams’s Fight for a Fair Vote, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/19/stacey-abrams-fight-for-
a-fair-vote [https://perma.cc/H8QL-FNUV]. The litigation is entitled Ebenezer Baptist 
Church of Atlanta v. Raffensperger. Fair Fight Action, Inc. was the lead plaintiff but has 
since dropped out of the litigation. 
 21. Many of the policy’s most controversial provisions have since been 
eliminated. See Press Release, Stanley Augustin, Georgia Largely Abandons Its Broken 
“Exact Match” Voter Registration Process (Apr. 5, 2019), https://lawyerscommittee 
.org/georgia-largely-abandons-its-broken-exact-match-voter-registration-process 
[https://perma.cc/64GG-CNA9]. 
 22. Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 19–22, Fair Fight 
Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 1:18-cv-05391 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2019). 
 23. Id. at 22. Some changes to the state’s election system have been made. See 
Cobb, supra note 20 (reporting that, in addition to installing new voting machines, 
Governor Kemp signed bills which extended the “use it or lose it” period to five 
calendar years and ensured protections for voters who use absentee or provisional 
ballots, and Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger has opened up an 
investigation into the 4700 absentee ballot applications that went missing in 2018). On 
December 27, 2019, the district court judge hearing the case denied plaintiffs’ request for 
a preliminary injunction, which sought the reinstatement of approximately 100,000 voters 
who had been removed from the voter rolls. Elisha Brown, Federal Judge Backs Georgia’s 
Purge of Nearly 100,000 Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/12/27/us/elections/georgia-voters-purge.html. 
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to navigate insofar as it does not require voters to travel long distances 
or wait in long lines, does not intentionally or unintentionally 
disadvantage minority voters, does not raise administrative burdens 
that are likely to discourage participation, does not discount or discard 
provisional and absentee ballots, and which is safe from outside 
interference or tampering. Anything less, it is argued, presents 
constitutional and/or statutory concerns.24 Such a comprehensive 
conception is a prerequisite to the robust protection of organizations’ 
political rights. Put differently, the voting process is multifaceted and 
implicates myriad actors and institutions, not simply individual voters. 
Organizations, whether through voter registration or civic education 
initiatives, play an essential role in our electoral system. 
In sum, the enormous stakes of Election 2020 have heightened the 
election-related concerns of voters, voting-rights advocates, and 
elected officials. Georgia is only one of many battlegrounds. The 
misgivings articulated by Fair Fight Action’s suit are shared by 
individuals and organizations across the nation, resulting in a 
proliferation of lawsuits.25 This Essay evaluates two such lawsuits 
involving organizations that facilitate political participation and the 
question of whether litigation of this type may, in fact, result in a 
more capacious understanding of the boundaries of the right to vote. 
Part I of this Essay summarizes the unresolved—and potentially 
dispositive—doctrinal debate over the appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny to be applied to state laws implicating both voting and 
expressive association. Part II examines the doctrinal irresolution in 
the context of two recent cases, Miracle v. Hobbs in Arizona and League 
of Women Voters v. Hargett in Tennessee. Viewed together, these cases 
illustrate the contingent nature of organizations’ ability to engage 
voters; an ambiguity of great consequence as we approach Election 
2020. Part III outlines the short and long-term political significance 
of whether a capacious or circumscribed conception of the right to 
vote in this context prevails. 
I.    JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL REGULATIONS 
Election laws (along with federal and state constitutional provisions) 
implicating the right to vote come in seemingly countless forms. Such 
laws dictate everything from who is eligible to participate to the order 
in which candidates are placed on a ballot. Election Day is of course 
also highly regulated, with, for instance, the precise method of voting 
varying from county to county and limits placed on polling place 
activity.26 Additional laws inform how votes are tallied and how post-
election disputes are resolved.27 On one level, this makes sense. The 
 
 24. Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 22, at 1, 85–86. 
 25. See, e.g., Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 655, 657 (2017) (“On the voting front, frenetic legislative and regulatory activity, 
primarily at the state level, has generated substantial litigation but little doctrinal clarity.”); 
Press Release, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Memo: Democratic 
Campaign Committees Investing Millions to Protect Voting Rights Across Battleground 
States (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.dscc.org/press-release/memo-democratic-campaign-
committees-investing-millions-to-protect-voting-rights-across-battleground-states 
[https://perma.cc/US46-L6GM]. 
 26. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (“[W]e hold that requiring 
solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not constitute 
an unconstitutional compromise.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Jonathan Lai, Pennsylvania’s Presidential Election Could Be Too Close to 
Call for Days Because of a New Law, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www. 
inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-2020-presidential-election-results-
absentee-ballots-20200117.html [https://perma.cc/VZJ3-YQCS] (“[A] new law 
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right to vote is fundamental—in both the colloquial and constitutional 
senses28—and is the cornerstone of our democracy; the voting process 
should therefore be highly regulated. That said, its designation as a 
fundamental right ostensibly elevates the burden on government to 
sustain such regulations. 
Complicating matters further is the First Amendment right of 
association and its appositeness in the voting context. As Daniel 
Tokaji has detailed, the Supreme Court has long perceived the rights 
to vote and to expressive association as closely tethered, 
complementary rights.29 The connection was drawn in Williams v. 
Rhodes,30 a case involving a challenge to several Ohio election laws 
brought by two third parties: the Ohio American Independent Party, 
a vehicle for the 1968 presidential candidacy of George Wallace, and 
the Socialist Labor Party.31 
Before Williams, Ohio law required new political parties seeking 
placement on the state’s presidential ballot to present signed 
petitions by qualified electors totaling at least fifteen percent of the 
ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election.32 In addition, 
new parties were required to file their nominating petitions in 
February, well before the two major parties.33 The Supreme Court 
concluded that Ohio “has made it virtually impossible for a new 
political party, even though it has hundreds of thousands of 
members, or an old party, which has a very small number of 
members, to be placed on the state ballot.”34 The Court expressly 
invoked the connection between the right to vote and the First 
Amendment right of expressive association, stating, “[n]o extended 
discussion is required to establish that the Ohio laws before us give 
the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new 
parties struggling for existence and thus place substantially unequal 
burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associate.”35 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated the laws.36 
The Court’s application of strict scrutiny to voting-related 
restrictions comported with prior caselaw37 and, for a short time, 
 
means a significant share of ballots might not be tallied until after Election Day, 
according to county elections officials.”). 
 28. The Supreme Court has designated the right to vote as a “fundamental 
right.” Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–67 (1966). But see Joshua A. 
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 157 
(2008) (noting that “the Court sometimes considers the right to vote as fundamental 
and sometimes conspicuously omits any fundamental rights language”). 
 29. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 771 (“The Supreme Court has long flirted with the 
idea that voting is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment but has never 
adopted this position. It has, however, held that voting is a form of expressive 
association protected by the First Amendment.”); see also Yablon, supra note 25, at 679 
(making the related point that “[t]hese open-ended constitutional guarantees of 
equality and of expressive and associational liberty are not so rigidly deterministic”). 
 30. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
 31. Id. at 26. On the presidential candidacies and legacy of George Wallace, see Frank 
Rich, After Trump, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://nymag.com/inteligencer/ 
2017/11/frank-rich-trumpism-after-trump.html [https://perma.cc/46UA-2WCN]. 
 32. Id. at 24–25. 
 33. Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 24. 
 35. Id. at 31. 
 36. Id. (“The State has here failed to show any ‘compelling interest’ which 
justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[S]ince the right to 
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must 
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”). 
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seemed to be the settled approach.38 Gradually, however, the Court 
began to intimate that heightened review was not always appropriate. 
In Storer v. Brown,39 the Court heard a challenge to California’s “sore 
loser” law40 that prohibited candidates who had lost a primary 
election from running as an independent in the general election. 
The Court upheld the law, noting “as a practical matter, there must 
be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany 
the democratic processes.”41 Accordingly, the initial task is now to 
assess whether the law at issue is, in fact, invidious—an inquiry that, 
by extension, determines the appropriate standard of review.42 
Storer presaged the Court’s introduction of an election-law-specific 
form of judicial review now commonly referred to as “Anderson-
Burdick,” a shorthand for the two cases from which it derives: Anderson 
v. Celebrezze43 and Burdick v. Takushi.44 The challenge in Anderson was 
to an Ohio law requiring independent presidential candidates—the 
plaintiff was independent presidential candidate John Anderson45—
to submit petition signatures no later than March of the election year, 
despite the fact that the two major parties would not select their 
nominees for several more months.46 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the majority cited Williams v. Rhodes to 
establish the link between the right to vote and the right of expressive 
association.47 He then, though, asserted “[a]lthough these rights of 
voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the States on 
candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect 
burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to choose among 
candidates.”48 Thus, as foreshadowed in Storer, Justice Stevens 
instructed courts to first determine the severity of the alleged injury. 
The central passage details the process: 
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of 
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It 
then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In 
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is 
the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged 
provision is unconstitutional.49 
 
 38. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) 
(“[I]n this case, we must give the statute a close and exacting examination.”); see also 
Douglas, supra note 28, at 151 (“At one time, the Court always construed the right to 
vote in the context of voter eligibility as a fundamental right, but now the 
jurisprudence is not as clear.”). 
 39. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 40. On sore loser laws, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and 
Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J. 1013 (2011). 
 41. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 44. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 45. Scott Neuman, John Anderson, Independent for President in 1980, Dies at 95, NPR 
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/05/568489924/ 
john-anderson-independent-for-president-in-1980-dies-at-95 
[https://perma.cc/WHQ2-GXFP]. 
 46. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790–91. 
 47. Id. at 786–87. 
 48. Id. at 788. 
 49. Id. at 789. 
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The majority found the Ohio law failed this test, notably, in part 
because of the prospect of dampened enthusiasm and participation 
among independent candidates and their supporters (voters, 
volunteers, and donors).50 Outcome aside, Anderson introduced a less 
rigorous form of judicial review in the election regulations context.51 
Burdick, which upheld a Hawaii ban on write-in votes, offered a slight 
modification to this approach, clarifying that laws that impose a “severe” 
burden on the right to vote remain subject to strict scrutiny.52 By 
contrast, when laws impose only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions,”53 then “the State’s important regulatory interests are 
generally sufficient to justify” the law.54 As the Anderson-Burdick doctrine 
evolved, election law claims grounded in the First Amendment became far 
less common.55 However, adjacent doctrines directly pertaining to 
political speech reinforced the substantial constitutional protection 
afforded expressive association in the political context. 
The Court has long held that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom 
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is 
an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of 
speech.”56 In addition, “the freedom to join together in furtherance 
of common political beliefs ‘necessarily presupposes the freedom to 
identify the people who constitute the association.’”57 Such freedom 
extends not only to individuals but to organizations as well.58 The 
 
 50. Id. at 792 (highlighting that in addition to barring potential candidates who 
decided to run after March from running at all, and overly restraining candidates 
that did decide to run by the deadline, the Ohio law would hinder an independent 
campaign’s efforts to recruit volunteers, raise funds, and secure publicity). 
 51. Josh Douglas notes that “Anderson confirmed that the Court no longer 
approached an election law case from a fundamental rights framework.” Douglas, 
supra note 28, at 159. Armand Derfner and J. Gerald Hebert lament the decision’s 
introduction of what they call a “lenient balancing test.” Armand Derfner & J. Gerald 
Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 481 (2016). But cf. Samuel 
Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 92 IND. L.J. 
299, 307 (2016) (critiquing the decision for “craft[ing] a test that brought election 
regulation perilously close to the generally crushing least-restrictive-means analysis 
from First Amendment law”). 
 52. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 
U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 53. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
 54. Id.; see Tokaji, supra note 11, at 777 (“Burdick’s main doctrinal contribution is 
to clarify that only a restriction that is ‘severe’ should receive strict scrutiny, requiring 
government to show it is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.”); Derfner & 
Hebert, supra note 51, at 483 (“While the Anderson ‘balancing test’ was vague and left 
significant room for restrictions on voting, depending on its interpretation, Burdick 
further increased the task of those challenging voting restrictions and lowered the 
practical level of review to something akin to rational basis review.”); see also Yablon, 
supra note 25, at 661 (“On the voting side, the Court has downplayed the burdens 
that regulations impose, cast the government’s regulatory interests in broad terms, 
and placed the onus squarely on plaintiffs to establish that a regulation’s burdens 
outweigh its benefits.”). After applying its new test to Hawaii’s law, the Court 
determined that the state’s interests in preventing contentious elections and in 
discouraging “party raiding” during primaries sufficiently outweighed the burden 
that the ban on write-in voting has on voters. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439–40. 
 55. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 784. 
 56. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 57. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986) (quoting 
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)). 
 58. Political parties receive considerable protection under the First Amendment. 
See e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 
(1989) (“If the challenged law burdens the rights of political parties and their 
members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows that it advances a 
compelling state interest . . . .”). Nonpartisan organizations engaged in political activity 
are similarly protected. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (“Where groups, formal or informal, seek to advance their goals through the 
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precise relationship, however, between these core First Amendment 
doctrines and states’ essential need to regulate the electoral process 
remains a source of confusion. 
In select contexts, the Court has distinguished laws that regulate 
“the mechanics of the electoral process”59 from those that regulate 
“pure speech,”60 subjecting the latter to “exacting scrutiny”61 rather 
than the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Yet to date, this distinction 
has been inadequately developed in the lower courts. In sum, the 
appropriate form of judicial review of organizations’ involvement in 
the political process is distinctly unsettled.62 
II.    COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE: EXAMPLES 
FROM ARIZONA AND TENNESSEE 
As Part I made clear, uncertainty remains over the appropriate degree 
of judicial scrutiny to be applied to state laws implicating both voting 
and expressive association. This Part examines the doctrinal irresolution 
in the context of two recent cases: Miracle v. Hobbs63 (Arizona) and 
League of Women Voters of Tennessee v. Hargett64 (Tennessee). 
A.   Miracle v. Hobbs 
In 2014, the Arizona legislature enacted a law commonly referred to 
as the “Strikeout Law.”65 The law requires the Arizona Secretary of State 
to strike all signatures gathered by a “registered” initiative petition 
circulator66 if the circulator fails to appear in response to a subpoena.67 A 
subpoena may be sought by any person “in the superior court of the 
county in which the circulator is registered.”68 Supporters of the law, 
including state officials, defend the law as a method of preventing fraud 
and preserving the integrity of the ballot initiative process.69 The law 
threatens to have a significant impact on the initiative process in 
Arizona, a state in which direct democracy is commonplace.70 
In July 2019, a group of both petition circulators (who are also 
registered voters) and, importantly here, organizations involved in 
 
electoral process, regulations preventing their members from becoming [election] 
registrars impair their ability effectively to organize and make their voices heard.”). 
 59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 346 (citation omitted). 
 62. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 316–17 (2007). 
 63. Complaint at 1, Miracle v. Hobbs, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. July 11, 2019). 
 64. Complaint at 1, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-
00385 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2019). 
 65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-118(E) (2019); see Howard Fischer, Judge Lets 
Arizona Law on Initiative Petitions to Stand, ARIZ. CAP. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2019/12/16/judge-lets-arizona-law-on-initiative-
petitions-to-stand [https://perma.cc/Z8JH-EYUB] (noting that the law has “been 
dubbed the Strikeout Law”). 
 66. Only paid and nonresident petition circulators are required to register. § 19-118(A). 
 67. § 19-118(E) (“If a registered circulator is properly served with a subpoena to 
provide evidence in an action regarding circulation of petitions and fails to appear or 
produce documents as provided for in the subpoena, all signatures collected by that 
circulator are deemed invalid.”). 
 68. § 19-118(F). 
 69. Howard Fischer, State Wants Challenge to Petition Law Thrown out of Court, 
https://tucson.com/news/local/state-wants-challenge-to-petition-law-thrown-out-of-court/ 
article_047e2c88-6508-52b7-ab96-cf9256b77a05.html [https://perma.cc/FV8A-DLK4]. 
 70. The law was previously upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court when 
challenged under state law. Stanwitz v. Reagan, 429 P.3d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 2018). On 
direct democracy in Arizona, see Daniel A. Smith & Caroline Tolbert, The Instrumental and 
Educative Effects of Ballot Measures: Research on Direct Democracy in the American States, 7 ST. 
POL. & POL’Y Q. 416, 420 (2007) (providing data on statewide initiatives in Arizona). 
1626 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1617 
the initiative process, challenged the law under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that it “denies core constitutional 
rights of political speech and association, along with the right to vote or 
participate meaningfully in the initiative process.”71 More specifically, 
they claimed that “the “indiscriminate rejection of voter signatures”72 
based solely on a petition circulator’s failure to respond to a potentially 
dubious subpoena request “effectively silences hundreds of thousands of 
Arizona citizens who sponsor, circulate, or sign petitions, as well as those 
who associate with them to promote or fund initiatives in Arizona.”73 
The law, plaintiffs attested, thus chills speech by making it harder for 
initiative proponents to hire and retain petition circulators, thereby 
impermissibly decreasing the likelihood that initiative proponents will 
find success.74 The law also, plaintiffs argued, imposes an undue 
burden on the fundamental right to vote.75 
The Arizona Secretary of State defended the law by arguing that, 
because it does not directly regulate circulation or advocacy, it “does 
not implicate the First Amendment at all.”76 As framed, “[t]he crucial 
question for courts considering challenges to initiative-related 
regulations is thus whether the regulation directly bans anyone from 
circulating, or whether it merely regulates the circulation process.”77 
Defendant further argued, with regard to plaintiffs’ claim that the law 
would diminish the pool of circulators, that “all regulations of 
petition circulation potentially reduce the pool of available 
circulators”78 and that the law imposes only a “lesser,” fully justified 
burden.79 Moreover, “[t]he fact that a regulation makes it less likely 
that initiatives will be enacted is . . . not constitutionally 
determinative.”80 Finally, regarding the claim that the law imposes an 
undue burden on the fundamental right to vote, defendant argued 
that signature invalidations “have nothing to do with the petition 
signers and everything to do with whether those who circulate the 
petitions comply with the applicable rules.”81 
The parties are equally at odds over the appropriate level of 
judicial review in cases of this type, betraying a fundamental 
disagreement that, as noted above, persists among reviewing courts. 
Plaintiffs argued, first, that because the Strikeout Law restricts “core 
political speech” by chilling speech and reducing plaintiffs’ 
likelihood of success, strict scrutiny should be applied.82 Alternatively, 
because initiatives implicate the fundamental right to vote, they 
should be evaluated under Anderson-Burdick, under which, recall, a 
severe burden on voters also triggers strict scrutiny.83 By contrast, as 
 
 71. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Miracle v. Hobbs, No. 
2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. July 11, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
 72. Id. at 4. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support 
at 9–10, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (July 18, 2019), ECF No. 9. 
 75. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 71, at 33. 
 76. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, Miracle, No. 
2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019), ECF No. 16. 
 77. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
at 1, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (Sept. 13, 2019), ECF No. 25. 
 78. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 76, at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 14. 
 81. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Reply in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 77, at 8. 
 82. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, 
supra note 74, at 7–10. 
 83. Id. at 15 (“Because their right to meaningfully participate in the initiative 
process hinges solely on a factor outside their knowledge or control that is 
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noted above, defendant argued that neither the First Amendment 
nor the fundamental right to vote is implicated at all, and, 
consequently, the defendant could easily satisfy the applicable 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test.84  
In ruling on plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, the district court judge 
agreed with the defendant that the relevant precedents draw a 
distinction between “laws that regulate the communicative conduct of 
persons advocating a particular message and laws that regulate the 
procedures by which legislation is enacted.”85 The judge therefore 
determined, based on that distinction, that because the Strikeout Law 
does not implicate “the communicative message associated with the 
physical act of circulation at the time of circulation,” any resulting 
injuries are only incidental to plaintiffs’ expressive association 
rights.86 The law is focused not on speech or association, but on 
“subpoena-related compliance that comes into play only after all 
initiative-related speech has occurred.”87 Accordingly, the judge 
concluded, judicial review asks only whether the burden on political 
speech is reasonably related to an important state interest, a question 
the judge answered in the affirmative.88 
B.   League of Women Voters of Tennessee v. Hargett 
The ruling in Miracle stands in stark contrast with a recent order 
from a district court in Tennessee granting a request for a 
preliminary injunction in a similar context. The order provides a 
clear illustration of how judicial doctrine could evolve to provide 
stronger First Amendment protection to organizations engaged in 
political activity. In April 2019, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a 
law regulating voter registration drives.89 The law, which has since been 
repealed,90 required organizations and individuals planning such drives 
to register with the state’s Coordinator of Elections and complete 
government-provided training.91 The law further mandated that voter 
registration forms be delivered within ten days of completion and, most 
controversially, contained civil penalties for those who submitted 
“‘incomplete’ voter registration applications,” even if unknowingly.92 
Finally, the law required organizations to adhere to a disclaimer 
provision for any “public communication regarding voter registration 
 
completely unconnected to any indication that their signature was not valid, these 
burdens are severe and the restriction must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.”). 
 84. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 76, at 7–8, 16. 
 85. Order at 3, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 36 
(citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1988); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 182–83 (1999)). 
 86. Id. at 6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 5–6, 12 (concluding that the Strikeout Law does not warrant strict scrutiny 
because the law impacts activity only after protected speech has occurred and dismissing 
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to vote claims because the Arizona Supreme Court 
had already determined that the law did not impede the initiative process).  
 89. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2-142 to -143, 2-19-132 (2019). 
 90. Press Release, Campaign Legal Center, Tennessee Removes Anti-Voter 
Registration Provisions Following Federal Legal Challenge (Apr. 2, 2020), https:// 
campaignlegal.org/press-releases/tennessee-removes-anti-voter-registration-
provisions-following-federal-legal [https://perma.cc/ABZ3-JHSX]. 
 91. § 2-2-142(a)(1)(C); Memorandum at 3, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v. 
Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019), ECF No. 60. 
 92. Memorandum at 4-5, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019), 
ECF No. 60. 
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status.”93 The plaintiffs in the case—a group of organizations that engage 
in voter registration drives—claimed that the law unconstitutionally 
burdened their First Amendment rights of speech and association.94 
They further argued that the law directly interfered with the 
fundamental right to vote.95 
As in Miracle, the parties disputed what the applicable standard of 
review is in a case involving efforts by organizations to engage voters 
in the political process.96 Notably, the district court judge agreed with 
plaintiffs that “exacting scrutiny” was appropriate, given that the case 
involved more than just a contest between individuals’ right to vote 
and the state’s power to regulate the electoral process; the case 
“implicate[s] more than those two sets of concerns.”97 In enjoining 
the law in September 2019, the judge articulated a conception of 
voting rights and political participation vastly different than what was 
presented in Miracle. As stated, “[e]ncouraging others to register to 
vote is ‘pure speech,’ and because that speech is political in nature, it 
is a ‘core First Amendment activity.’”98 
By contrast with the Miracle court’s recognition of a line between 
“laws that regulate the communicative conduct of persons advocating 
a particular message and laws that regulate the procedures by which 
legislation is enacted,”99 the judge in Hargett voiced 
skeptic[ism] that the First Amendment would countenance 
“slic[ing] and dic[ing] the activities involved in the plaintiffs’ voter 
registration drives” for constitutional purposes, both because doing 
so would allow the government to burden the protected aspects of 
the drive indirectly and because the “entire voter registration 
activity” implicates the “freedom of the plaintiffs to associate with 
others for the advancement of common beliefs [that] is protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”100 
Likewise, whereas the Miracle court viewed subpoena-compliance as 
a mere bureaucratic concern, divorced from the associational aspects 
of the initiative process, the judge in Hargett concluded that “while 
the civil penalties for incomplete applications are directed only at the 
paperwork aspect of a drive, the threat of penalties is likely to have a 
chilling effect on the entirety of the drive, including its communicative 
aspects.”101 With regard to the registration and training requirements, 
the court found the former unnecessary, particularly prior to 
conducting a voter registration drive,102 and the latter an unwarranted 
imposition of government speech.103 The court also enjoined the 
 
 93. Id. at 6–7 (describing how the disclaimer provision required voter 
registration organizations to “display a disclaimer that such [public] communication 
is not made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state”). 
 94. Complaint at 40–43, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
 95. Id. at 50. 
 96. Memorandum at 18–19, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 
2019), ECF No. 60 (“Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the requirements should be 
subject to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ whereas the defendants argue that they should be 
subject only to some lesser standard of review.”). After reviewing the variable 
standards of review that courts have used in similar cases, the court later referred to 
“this sometimes bewildering array of standards to choose from.” Id. at 22–23. 
 97. Id. at 23. 
 98. Id. at 19 (quoting League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 
2d 1155, 1158 (N.D. Fla. 2012)). 
 99. Supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 100. Memorandum at 20, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019), 
ECF No. 60 (citing Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 401, 404 (5th Cir. 
2013) (Davis, J., dissenting)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 29. 
 103. Id. at 31 (“The state’s interest in avoiding errors might, therefore, justify a 
simpler application form or a public education program, but there is substantial 
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penalties for the submission of incomplete applications, noting that 
“‘the collection and submission of applications is inextricably 
intertwined with’ the expressive and advocatory aspects of the drive, 
and it is impossible to burden one without, in effect, burdening the 
other.”104 Finally, the court found the disclaimer requirement to 
constitute unconstitutionally compelled speech.105 
The conception of the “right to vote” expressed in Hargett is 
substantially more capacious than that expressed in Miracle. The 
voting ecosystem portrayed in Hargett is multi-dimensional and 
functions at its best when state oversight, though necessary, is 
judiciously calibrated. The judge’s sensitivity to this point is perhaps 
best captured through her closing critique of the “cumulative 
burden” that the Tennessee law’s provisions, when taken together, 
imposed on organizations.106 Writing of the organizations’ 
“vulnerability,”107 she noted: 
The Act would attack their limited resources from all sides. The 
disclaimer and registration requirements produce compliance costs 
for what might be an already cash-strapped organization. The 
training and penalty provisions hamper the organization’s ability to 
recruit qualified volunteers and registration workers. Then, when 
the voter registration drive is done, the organization’s already-
depleted resources may be drained by fines.108 
Viewed in its entirety, the judge concluded that the law would likely 
fail whether evaluated under strict scrutiny or the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test.109 
In conclusion, both Miracle and Hargett share factual and legal 
similarities insofar as they both involved organizations seeking to 
increase political participation in ways that implicate the fundamental 
right to vote,110 yet reached decidedly divergent outcomes regarding 
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied, and the 
bearing the First Amendment has on the resolution of such disputes. 
III.    THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM POLITICAL STAKES 
This Part outlines the short- and long-term political significance of 
whether a capacious or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in 
this context prevails. A capacious view is one in which many organizational 
efforts to increase political participation are deemed protected activities 
 
reason to doubt that it can justify the unusually aggressive insertion of government 
speech into private political association that the Act contemplates.”). 
 104. Id. at 34 (quoting League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 
1314, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2006)). 
 105. Id. at 35–37. 
 106. Id. at 41. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Recall the similar reasoning expressed by Justice Stevens in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), supra note 50, and accompanying text. 
 109. Memorandum at 42, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019), 
ECF No. 60. 
 110. One could argue that petitions for ballot initiatives are distinct from voter 
registration drives, thereby justifying distinct judicial treatment. In Meyer v. Grant, 486 
U.S. 414 (1988), and Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 
182 (1999), the Supreme Court issued rulings on the constitutionality of state laws 
regulating the initiative process. In both cases the Court invalidated Colorado 
restrictions on petition circulators. However, the Court has not addressed the 
constitutionality of laws regulating voter registration that are similar to what was 
enacted in Tennessee. Notably, the judge in Hargett expressly rejected the suggested 
distinction, finding both petition drives for ballot initiatives and voter registration 
drives to be “central to shared political life.” Id. at 25–26; see also Derfner & Hebert, 
supra note 51, at 488 (“The expressive nature of the vote is present whether the vote 
is for a candidate in a primary or general election or for a ballot proposition, recall, 
referendum or anything else called a vote.”). 
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that warrant heightened judicial review. Such a view was evident in 
Hargett.111 A circumscribed view affords deference, under a lesser form 
of judicial review, to state regulations that increase administrative 
burdens and impose compliance costs on organizations attempting to 
engage the citizenry.112 Such a view was evident in Miracle.113 
In the short term, obviously, the organizations operating in Arizona 
and Tennessee face very different environments. In Arizona, 
subpoena challenges could prove fatal to the signature-gathering 
efforts of initiative petition circulators. At the time of this writing, the 
district court judge hearing Miracle has recently denied a motion for 
reconsideration.114 An appeal to the Ninth Circuit may follow. 
Meanwhile, petition circulators are gathering signatures to place an 
initiative on the 2020 ballot that would ban “dark money” in Arizona 
elections.115 A separate initiative effort would, among other things, 
require automatic voter registration and limit political spending.116 The 
resolution of Miracle will directly impact the likelihood of whether these 
initiatives are put to the voters. In Tennessee, given the legislature’s 
repeal of the voter registration law, voter registration organizations 
are now free to collect and submit voter registration forms without 
the fear of civil penalties being levied on them for unwittingly 
submitting incomplete forms. 
More broadly, courts’ decisions about whether to adopt a capacious 
or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in this context will 
likely determine the legality of dozens of similar laws being 
challenged around the country. For example, the Eastern District of 
Michigan is hearing challenges to two Michigan laws: one that makes 
it a misdemeanor to “hire a motor vehicle”117 to take voters to polling 
stations unless they are “physically unable to walk,” and another that 
makes it a crime to help voters submit absentee ballots.118 Though the 
facts differ from those of Miracle and Hargett, the essential legal 
question is the same: are organizations that seek to engage the 
citizenry for the purpose of increasing political participation able to 
operate free of only the most necessary impediments? 
Greater political participation is normatively desirable independent 
of any electoral consequences. However, the levels of voter turnout 
and citizen participation—i.e., the individuals both inspired to and 
permitted to participate—in Election 2020 may be the dispositive 
 
 111. Memorandum at 24, 26–27, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 
2019), ECF No. 60. 
 112. The economist Richard Thaler has aptly described such administrative 
burdens as “sludge.” Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, SCI. (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6401/431.full 
[https://perma.cc/D3X2-LP6T]. 
 113. Order at 14, Miracle v. Hobbs, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 
2019), ECF No. 36. 
 114. Order at 12, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2020), ECF No. 58. 
 115. Jeremy Duda, Effort to End ‘Dark Money’ in AZ Campaigns Hires Paid Circulators, 
ARIZ. MIRROR (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.azmirror.com/blog/effort-to-end-dark-
money-in-az-campaigns-hires-paid-circulators [https://perma.cc/7WVX-WKAK]. On 
“dark money,” see Joshua S. Sellers, Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of Political 
and Criminal Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 676–83 (2018). 
 116. Steven Hsieh, Ballot Initiative Would Limit Big Campaign Donors, Transform Elections 
in Arizona, PHX. NEW TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://www.phoenix 
newtimes.com/news/ballot-initiative-would-make-it-easier-to-vote-in-arizona-11379200 
[https://perma.cc/557X-56GE]. In full disclosure, I am on the Board of the Arizona 
Advocacy Network and Foundation, the sponsoring organization of this initiative. 
 117. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.931(1)(f) (2020). 
 118. § 168.759(4), (5), (8); Complaint at 2–3, Priorities USA v. Nessel, No. 2:19-cv-
13341 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2019). 
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factors in many electoral outcomes.119 Particularly with regard to 
voter registration, the ability of nonpolitical party organizations to 
mount effective voter registration drives is of great consequence. In 
an insightful recent article, Bertrall Ross and Douglas Spencer detail 
how political parties and campaign organizations, largely for strategic 
reasons, systematically fail to engage with certain members of the 
citizenry.120 The authors argue that because voter mobilization efforts 
come at a cost, campaigns must be strategic about whom they 
contact. Given resource limitations, the most sensible strategy is to 
contact those most likely to participate in an election and support the 
campaign.121 As a result, nonvoters, many of whom have lower 
socioeconomic statuses, are rarely mobilized.122 Consequently, the work 
done by voter registration organizations over the coming months in 
communicating with and registering nonvoters is essential to increase 
voter participation rates this fall and beyond. As explicated above, the 
viability of these organizations’ operations depends on how much 
constitutional protection their activities receive. 
In the long term, a larger, philosophical question must be addressed: 
how much do we value equality of political participation?123 As repeated 
above, a capacious conception of the right to vote is inherently dubious 
of government efforts to curb political participation and apprehends 
the links between organizational outreach and engagement. Under 
this conception, courts would closely scrutinize laws that allegedly 
undermine participatory efforts.124 Adoption of such a conception 
abets a more grandiose, inclusive notion of civic participation that 
should be encouraged. 
A long-term outlook also reveals that a capacious conception of the 
right to vote holds the promise of reducing partisan abuse. Though 
not emphasized in this Essay, many of the recent laws impacting 
organizations are partisan power plays, designed to dampen the 
political participation of groups believed to hold sympathies for 
political opponents. A circumscribed conception of the right to vote 
makes it more difficult to respond to this fact. If courts, however, 
comprehensively probe the relationship between electoral 
 
 119. See Nate Cohn, Huge Turnout Is Expected in 2020. So Which Party Would Benefit?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/2020-
election-turnout-analysis.html; William A. Galston, What Does High Voter Turnout Tell 
Us About the 2020 Elections?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.brookings. 
edu/blog/fixgov/2019/11/20/what-does-high-voter-turnout-tell-us-about-the-2020-
elections [https://perma.cc/UB3P-2JWS]. 
 120. Bertrall L. Ross II & Douglas M. Spencer, Passive Voter Suppression: Campaign 
Mobilization and the Effective Disfranchisement of the Poor, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 633, 680 (2019) 
(“There is one consistent feature that cuts across virtually all contemporary campaign 
mobilization strategies: the avoidance of unregistered, infrequent, and nonvoters.”). 
 121. Id. at 678–80. 
 122. Id. at 680–87. 
 123. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, 
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2412 (2003) (arguing “that the decision 
whether to cabin official discretion, or, alternatively, to adopt a more deferential test 
in a given context reflects a judgment, usually a silent one, about the relative value of 
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regulations, expressive association, and political participation, 
doctrinal space exists to consider the central role of partisanship in 
many of these contests.125 
A final long-term concern, one focused more on law than on 
politics per se, is the achievement of doctrinal harmonization. 
Scholars have long argued that voting is a type of speech and should 
be recognized as such under the First Amendment.126 Federal courts’ 
difficulties reconciling Anderson-Burdick’s balancing test with First 
Amendment jurisprudence is intellectually intriguing, yet leaves 
voters, organizations, and litigants in an untenable state of 
uncertainty. A unifying theory of political participation—one that 
includes organizations—would therefore be of enormous benefit.127 
CONCLUSION 
Looking ahead, the judiciary’s immensely important role in defining 
the nature of democratic engagement is apparent. Though this is by 
now a familiar role, political circumstances are always changing such 
that even basic legal disputes, even the most pedestrian, emerge in new 
forms. In some states, there seems to be an endless supply of creativity 
put towards shrinking the electorate.128 The recurrent nature of these 
disputes, especially as we approach Election 2020, creates the possibility 
of constructing a conception of the right to vote that encompasses 
clearly established First Amendment protections for organizations. In 
one sense this development would seem paradoxical, with more 
intensive methods of election administration ultimately expanding 
voting and expressive association rights. Yet, perhaps this possibility is 
not paradoxical at all. Perhaps the better understanding of such a 
development, one the history of voting rights reveals, is that the 
greatest opportunities for broadening the electorate and increasing 
political engagement—both of which are goals to which we should 
aspire—arise when opposition is greatest. 
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